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State Court Judges Are Not Bound by
Nonoriginalist Supreme Court Interpretations
Lee J. Strang*
I. INTRODUCTION
Federalism is an important structural principle of the United States 
Constitution.1 The existence of the states, and the accompanying federal-
state relationship—and tension—are enduring features—not bugs—of our 
federal system.2 Federalism also advances a number of important values, 
including protection of individual liberty,3 jurisdictional experimentation,4
and greater satisfaction of the reasonable diversity of different forms of 
human flourishing.5
Most scholarly discussion of and cases concerning federalism have 
involved state legislatures and executives. These primarily arise in the 
context of preemption, which was precipitated by creative and broad post-
New Deal interpretations of federal power that had, as one effect, the 
significant displacement of state regulatory authority.6 Congress passed 
statutes that directly regulated private parties or created administrative 
           *       John W. Stoepler Professor of Law & Values, The University of Toledo College of Law. 
Many thanks to the FIU Law Review and Professor Elizabeth Price Foley for organizing and hosting the 
Separation of Powers Symposium, and the Symposium participants and audience for their thoughtful 
comments and suggestions. This Essay represents my tentative thoughts on this subject. Some of my 
claims need further development to both confirm and fully elucidate them. 
1 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012) (“Federalism, central to the 
constitutional design, adopts the principle that both the National and State Governments have elements 
of sovereignty the other is bound to respect.”).  
2 See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868) (“The Constitution, in all its provisions, 
looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.”); see also New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 162–63 (1992). 
3 See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) (“The independent power of the States . . . 
serves as a check on the power of the Federal Government . . . [and b]y denying any one government 
complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the individual 
from arbitrary power.”) (quotations omitted).
4 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, 
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.”).
5 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“This federalist structure of joint 
sovereigns preserves to the people numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized government that will 
be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society . . . .”).  
6 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (“[I]t is difficult to perceive any 
limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States 
historically have been sovereign.”).
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agencies that did so. For example, states traditionally regulated employer-
employee relationships via the common law and, with increasing regularity 
as the twentieth century went on, via statute and regulation. Congress 
preempted much of the state regulation of private labor relations during the 
New Deal7 in a series of statutes premised on the New Deal Court’s broad 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause8 and created an administrative 
agency to implement the acts.9 Scholarship has evaluated the extent to 
which this form of more-intrusive federal regulation has impacted 
federalism and whether that impact has been positive or negative. 
The role of state courts has received less attention in the federalism 
literature. This is understandable because the conventional view is that state 
courts are functionally interpretative adjuncts to the Supreme Court. “The 
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on federal questions 
are absolutely binding on the state courts and must be followed, regardless 
of those courts’ views.”10 However, state courts remain an important facet 
of federalism. In particular, states and their courts, as independent 
sovereigns in our federal system, retain independent interpretative authority, 
and their interpretations may—and, where appropriate, should—diverge 
from the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretations. 
In this Essay, I argue, from an originalist perspective, that state court 
judges must follow (1) United States Supreme Court judgments and (2) 
originalist constitutional interpretations found in Supreme Court opinions, 
but that state courts are not bound by (3) nonoriginalist Supreme Court 
interpretations of the Constitution.11 My claim hinges on two distinctions: 
(1) between judgments and opinions; and (2) between originalist and 
nonoriginalist decisions. I show that, because of state court judges’ location 
outside of the Article III hierarchy and their status as independent state 
sovereigns exercising state judicial power, they possess interpretative 
independence in the face of nonoriginalist Supreme Court interpretations. 
At the same time, because of the Article III “judicial Power” exercised by 
the Supreme Court, and the Supremacy Clause, state court judges must 
follow Supreme Court judgments and originalist Supreme Court opinions. 
This Essay tries to hit the “Goldilocks” zone of state court 
interpretative autonomy. It provides a space for state courts to contest 
nonoriginalist U.S. Supreme Court interpretations while, at the same time, 
7 Machinists v. Wis. Emp’t Rel. Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); San Diego Bldg. Trades 
Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
8 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
9 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (1935). 
10 21 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, Courts § 216 (2015). 
11 In the short space of this Essay, I offer only my tentative thoughts on the extent of state court 
interpretative independence from nonoriginalist Supreme Court interpretations.  
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preserving the Supreme Court’s and federal interpretative supremacy. It 
avoids both the pitfall of federal judicial interpretative supremacy and the 
pitfall of interpretative anarchy. 
II. THE STANDARD NARRATIVE: NO ROOM FOR FEDERALISM
The conventional story told by our legal practice and by nonoriginalist 
scholars is that the Supreme Court is the supreme interpreter of the 
Constitution. The Supreme Court famously equated its interpretations of the 
Constitution with the Constitution itself in Cooper v. Aaron.12
[Marbury v. Madison] declared the basic principle that the federal 
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, 
and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the 
Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional 
system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the 
land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the 
States . . . .13
More recently, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court reaffirmed its 
grandiose self-conception as the authoritative interpreter.14 Professor Daniel 
Farber summarized the scholarly wisdom when he concluded that “the 
Court [in Cooper] was largely correct in viewing its constitutional decisions 
as part of the law of the land.”15
The standard narrative provided by the conventional view is that the 
Supreme Court—building on seeds planted in Marbury v. Madison,16
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,17 and Cohens v. Virginia18—(finally!) articulated 
the constitutional rule that it is the “supreme” interpreter of the Constitution 
in Cooper v. Aaron. In Cooper, the Supreme Court claimed that its 
constitutional interpretations are binding on all other government officials.19
12  Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
13 Id. at 18.
14 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866–67 (1992) (“Where, in the 
performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of 
intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a 
dimension that the resolution of the normal case does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the 
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their 
national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.”).  
15  Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 
U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 390; see also John Yoo, Judicial Supremacy Has Its Limits, 20 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
1, 6 (2015) (“[I]t is fair to say that the majority of scholars support judicial supremacy.”).  
16  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  
17  Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).  
18  Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).  
19  Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1958).
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To reach this literally unprecedented conclusion, the Court articulated a 
syllogism that equated its interpretations of the Constitution with the 
Constitution itself.20
This conventional view offers little-to-no space for federalism to 
operate in the context of state courts. Indeed, that’s the conventional view’s 
whole point. One of the Cooper Court’s goals was to eliminate state officer 
interpretative independence. 
The Cooper Court was famously short on justification for its 
momentous assertion.21 As with many other instances where the Warren 
Court made bold claims with, at best, modest argumentative support, 
scholars since Cooper have offered different justifications to support 
Cooper’s conclusion.22
Originalist scholarship in the area of the authority of Supreme Court 
decisions, as in many areas, has staked out a different path. Thus far, most 
originalist scholarship has focused on the relative interpretative authority of 
the three branches of the federal government.23 The consensus of scholars 
who have investigated this subject is that the Supreme Court’s judgments
are binding on the other branches,24 and the Court’s constitutional 
interpretations that justify its judgments and which are contained in its 
opinions are not authoritative on the other branches.25
The scholars who have argued for this interpretative dichotomy made a 
number of arguments. For instance, these scholars argued that each branch 
of the federal government must utilize its own, independent interpretative 
judgment because they must ascertain what the Constitution means when 
they exercise their respective executive and legislative powers pursuant to 
their oaths of office.26
In this Essay, I build on the interpretative dichotomy identified by 
these scholars and argue that Cooper was only partially correct. Cooper was 
right that U.S. Supreme Court judgments are binding on state courts, full 
stop. The Court was wrong, however, because only its originalist opinions 
are binding on state courts; the Court’s nonoriginalist interpretations are not 
20 Id. at 18.
21 Farber, supra note 15, at 388.
22 See, e.g., id. at 390 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s constitutional opinions are binding 
federal common law).
23 E.g., Yoo, supra note 15, at 1; William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807 
(2008); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation,
81 IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power 
to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994).
24 The important and powerfully argued exception is Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen. Paulsen, 
supra note 23, at 221–22.
25 See sources cited supra note 23.
26 Yoo, supra note 15, at 4–5.
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binding. 
III. STATE COURT JUDGES ARE OUTSIDE OF THE ARTICLE III HIERARCHY,
DO NOT EXERCISE FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER, AND ARE THEREFORE NOT
BOUND BY THE STARE DECISIS EFFECT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The United States Supreme Court’s opinions and judgments are 
binding on lower federal courts because of the power lower federal courts 
exercise and their place in the hierarchical structure of the federal judicial 
branch. State courts, by contrast, are outside of the federal judicial branch, 
and outside of the federal government altogether. Therefore, some rationale 
other than the one applicable to lower federal courts must be identified to 
justify the authority Supreme Court judgments and opinions possess over 
state courts, if any. 
The default rule of our federal system is that states and their courts are 
independent sovereigns.27 Only to the extent the American People delegated 
authority to the federal government, and that authority has been properly 
exercised, are states, their courts, and their citizens, constitutionally 
limited.28 Therefore, one must identify a source of constitutional authority 
that the U.S. Supreme Court lawfully exercised to direct state courts. 
Otherwise, state courts retain interpretative independence. 
This interpretative independence is, of course, bounded by the state 
court judges’ good faith adherence to their oaths. This is not interpretative 
anarchy. However, to the extent that one believes that the Constitution’s 
meaning is difficult to access, underdetermined, and that state judges are 
susceptible to bad faith, then interpretative variations will result from 
interpretative independence.29
Lower federal courts, by contrast, are bound by Supreme Court 
precedent, and for two related reasons. First, lower federal courts must 
follow Supreme Court precedent because they exercise “judicial Power.” 
Second, lower federal courts are bound by Supreme Court precedent 
because of their status as “inferior” to the Supreme Court. 
The federal judicial branch operates as a branch, with the members of 
the branch working together, in different capacities. The Constitution 
27  NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012); see also Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 
700, 725 (1868) (“The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of 
indestructible States.”).
28  U.S. CONST. amend. X; id. art. VI, cl. 2; see M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 
405 (1819) (“If any one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind, we might expect it 
would be this—that the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its 
sphere of action.”).
29  Though, the evidence suggests that state courts already exercise significant interpretative 
autonomy. Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court Is Not Supreme, 104 NW. U.L. REV. 979 (2010).
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established the Supreme Court30 and structured the federal court system,31
should Congress create lower federal courts,32 which it did in the 1789 
Judiciary Act.33 All federal judges within the Article III hierarchy exercise 
the same “judicial Power.”34 This power includes the requirement that 
federal judges give federal court precedent “significant respect.”35 How 
federal judges up and down the hierarchy afford the constitutionally-
required significant respect varies. For Supreme Court justices, the Court’s 
own originalist precedent must be followed unless there is significant 
evidence that the precedent did not correctly articulate or apply the 
Constitution’s original meaning.36 Supreme Court justices should overrule 
nonoriginalist precedent, unless doing so would gravely harm the common 
good.37
For lower federal court judges, their obligation is different because 
their position is “inferior.”38 Lower federal court judges must faithfully 
follow higher court precedent, regardless of its status as originalist or 
nonoriginalist. This is partially because of stare decisis. Stare decisis, as I 
noted, mandates that lower federal judges give Supreme Court precedent 
significant respect. 
However, there are other facets of lower federal court practice that 
stare decisis by itself fails to capture. In particular, lower federal court 
judges give both originalist and nonoriginalist precedent stare decisis 
respect, and the level of stare decisis respect is greater than significant 
respect. These modifications to the lower federal court practice of precedent 
is explained by the Article III hierarchy that makes lower federal courts 
“inferior” to the Supreme Court.39 Like “inferior”40 executive branch 
officers, who are answerable to higher-level officers including the 
President,41 lower federal court judges must follow higher court precedent, 
even if the lower federal court judges correctly believe it is incorrect. The 
30  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33  1789 Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).  
34  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
35  Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, 
and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419 (2006).
36 Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: The Privileged Place of Originalist 
Precedent, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1729, 1751 (2010).  
37  Strang, supra note 35, at 420.
38  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
39 Id.
40 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
41 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117–37 (1926) (explaining the Decision of 1789); 
Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021 (2006) (supporting 
Myers’ interpretation of the Decision).  
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practice of lower court judges following higher court precedent is relatively 
uncontroversial.42
The reasons why lower federal courts are bound by Supreme Court 
precedent do not apply to state courts. First, state courts do not exercise 
federal judicial power, and hence are not obligated to give Supreme Court 
precedent stare decisis respect. Second, state courts are not within the 
federal judicial branch and therefore are not inferior courts to the Supreme 
Court. 
State courts and state judges are not part of the federal judicial branch. 
Therefore, state court judges do not exercise “judicial Power.” They 
exercise the power conferred on them by their respective state constitutions. 
For example, the Ohio Constitution delegated to the Ohio judicial branch 
the “judicial power” of Ohio, not any federal power.43 In fact, our legal 
system’s conception of national popular sovereignty precludes the 
possibility of one state’s people granting federal power to that state’s 
courts.44 The different power exercised by state courts means that they are 
not subject to a constitutional obligation from Article III to give Supreme 
Court precedent any respect, much less significant respect. Instead, state 
court judges exercise whatever power they received from their state 
constitutions and the citizens of their states. 
The power state court judges exercise does not—at least not 
necessarily—require them to give federal court precedent (or any precedent, 
for that matter45) respect.46 State judges may have to do so, as a matter of 
their state constitutions’ meaning, but that is a contingent matter.47 And—
though I have not investigated this to a significant degree—it is unlikely 
that the original meaning of state judicial power includes respect for federal 
court precedent.48
42 See Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
23, 23–24 (1994) (“The authority of precedent is a postulate of our legal system. It is uncontroversial.”).  
43  OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
44 See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403–04 (1819) (“The government 
proceeds directly from the people; is ‘ordained and established,’ in the name of the people; and is 
declared to be ordained, ‘in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic 
tranquility, and secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and to their posterity.’”). 
45 See Mary Garvy Algero, Considering Precedent in Louisiana: Balancing the Value of 
Predictable and Certain Interpretation with the Tradition of Flexibility and Adaptability, 58 LOY. L.
REV. 113 (2012) (describing Louisiana’s evolution away from the civil law’s traditional lack of stare 
decisis toward some respect for past precedents).  
46 See Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal Court 
Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53, 62 (2015) (describing the various 
approaches state courts take to the precedential weight, if any, of federal court precedent).
47 Id.
48  This is prima facie unlikely for a number of reasons. For example, state judicial power in 
some states could not include the obligation to follow federal court precedent because those states’ 
constitutions were created prior to the federal court system. Additionally, a state’s people’s grant of state 
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Second, state court judges are not within the federal branch hierarchy, 
and therefore are not “inferior” to the federal courts, including the Supreme 
Court, within the meaning of Article III. Instead, state courts are part of 
their own state court hierarchies. Article III describes only those courts 
“ordain[ed] and establish[ed]” by Congress as inferior courts in the federal 
judicial hierarchy.49 Congress, of course, did not create state courts. 
Furthermore, Article III would require state court judges to hold their 
offices with Article III tenure and salary protections,50 which is not the case. 
A powerful piece of evidence confirming this interpretation is that lower 
federal courts have no appellate jurisdiction over state courts, even those 
within the federal courts’ geographic jurisdiction.51
Article III also lacks the sort of express statement of Supreme Court 
supervisory authority over the various state court systems that would make 
it clear that the state courts are inferior components of one federal court 
system. This possibly reflected “doubts about the power of the Supreme 
Court to exercise general powers of superintendence over the state court 
system.”52
Article III does make state courts subject to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction, but this does not convert them into Article III inferior 
courts.53 Appellate jurisdiction is the power to “revise and correct” an 
action initiated in another court.54 It may apply to a court within the same 
judicial system as the appellate court, but logically and historically, that 
need not be the case. Chief Justice Marshall relied on this distinction in 
Cohens v. Virginia to rebut Virginia’s Eleventh Amendment argument that 
the U.S. Supreme Court could not hear an appeal from a criminal case 
initiated in its courts.55
judicial power to the state’s courts would not include deference to federal court precedent because the 
state’s people were establishing and empowering a separate court system empowered by a separate 
sovereign.
49  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
50 Id. (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during 
good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not 
be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”).  
51 See Frost, supra note 46, at 55 (“Lower federal court precedent cannot bind state courts, or so 
we are told.”).
52  James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise 
Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1457 (2000).  
53 See James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality 
of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 191, 228–29 (2007) (arguing that Article III’s 
grant of appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court over state courts does not, by itself, adequately 
support a state court duty to follow Supreme Court precedent).  
54  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803) (“It is the essential criterion of 
appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does 
not create that cause.”).
55  Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 398 (1821) (arguing that the Eleventh 
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My description of the relationship between state courts and the U.S. 
Supreme Court is supported by the Supreme Court’s refusal, until very 
recently, to issue extraordinary writs to state courts. Extraordinary writs 
include discretionary writs, like mandamus. Superior courts utilized these 
extraordinary writs to maintain supremacy over and control of inferior 
courts.56 The Supreme Court issued these writs to lower federal courts since 
the Republic’s beginning to maintain its supremacy over them. By contrast, 
the first clear instance where the Supreme Court issued an extraordinary 
writ to a state court was not until 1978,57 and even then, the Supreme Court 
did not explain the source of its authority to do so.58 The Supreme Court’s 
failure to issue extraordinary writs to state courts until recently, and its 
failure to provide an explanation when it did so, shows that state courts are 
constitutionally not inferior courts. 
A potentially powerful counter-argument to my position is that state 
courts, to the extent they adjudicate federal questions, are “constitute[d]” 
federal tribunals by Congress under Article I, Section 8, Clause 7.59 These 
tribunals are “inferior to the supreme Court” and therefore are subject to the 
precedential weight of the Supreme Court’s cases.60 Article I tribunals 
created by Congress, such as military and territorial courts, fall within the 
scope of this Clause. Though I have not yet fully investigated this question, 
if Congress designated some or all state courts as federal courts, then it is 
likely those courts would have been “constitute[d]” by Congress and 
therefore “inferior” to the Supreme Court. However, even if that was 
theoretically possible, Congress has not done so. Instead, from the 
Republic’s beginning, Congress created a system of lower federal courts, 
and state courts, utilizing their own state judicial power, have also 
entertained federal claims from the Constitution’s initiation.61 State courts 
would do so in the context of suits and prosecutions brought within their 
own state-defined scope of jurisdiction. For example, the Maryland state 
court entertained an action for debt against the Baltimore branch of the 
Second Bank of the United States, and within that suit, the Bank’s cashier 
raised a federal constitutional defense.62 Absent a theory of implied 
Amendment may bar the Supreme Court from hearing a case in its original jurisdiction while not barring 
an appeal from such a case initially heard in state court).
56  Pfander, supra note 53, at 212–14.
57 See Gen. Atomic Co. v. Felter, 436 U.S. 493, 497 (1978).  
58  Pfander, supra note 53, at 230–31.
59  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7; see Pfander, supra note 53, at 229–32 (making this argument).
60 See Pfander, supra note 52; see also Pfander, supra note 53. 
61  Within their state-conferred jurisdiction, state courts have adjudicated federal claims pursuant 
to the Supremacy Clause’s command that state judges treat federal law as law of the state and to 
privilege it over contrary state law.  
62  M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 317 (1819). 
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“constitut[ing]” by Congress, which is implausible, Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 7 is not a source of state court constitutional inferiority. 
Furthermore, even if state courts were “inferior” to the Supreme Court 
in a manner identical to lower federal courts, state courts exercise state 
judicial power and not federal judicial power. Federal judicial power 
includes the obligation to give the Supreme Court’s precedent “significant 
respect.” Whether the state judicial power exercised by the state courts 
includes a similar requirement is contingent on the meaning of judicial 
power in each state. To my knowledge, there is no evidence on that 
question, and there are strong reasons to believe that state judicial power 
does not mean giving Supreme Court precedent stare decisis weight. For 
example, some of the state courts predated the creation of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, so the judicial power exercised by these state courts could not 
include giving respect to Supreme Court precedent.63
In sum, the reasons why lower federal courts must follow Supreme 
Court precedent do not apply to state courts. Below, I argue that state courts 
must follow originalist Supreme Court decisions, and Supreme Court 
judgments. 
IV. STATE COURT JUDGES ARE BOUND BY 
ORIGINALIST SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND NOT BOUND BY 
NONORIGINALIST SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
In this Part, I argue that state courts’ duty to follow U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions64 hinges on whether those decisions are originalist or 
nonoriginalist. A reminder that my argument assumes that originalism is the 
correct theory of interpretation. State court judges must follow originalist 
decisions, but not nonoriginalist decisions. Next, in Part V, I argue that, 
when subject to an otherwise-applicable nonoriginalist decision, state court 
judges must still follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s judgments in those 
precedents. 
State court judges are bound by originalist Supreme Court decisions 
because those decisions are correct interpretations of the Constitution. In 
this originalist precedent, the Supreme Court articulates the Constitution’s 
meaning as fixed at its point of ratification and applies that meaning to the 
63  Even if these state constitutions were amended following adoption of the current Constitution 
and establishment of the federal Supreme Court, the point remains that it was not necessary for state 
judicial power to include respect for Supreme Court precedent.  
64  Here, in Part IV, I use the label “decision” to describe the subject of analysis at a relatively 
high level of generality and to elide the distinction between a court’s judgment and its opinion. As I 
describe in Part V, a decision typically includes both a judgment and an opinion. I also use “decision” as 
synonymous with “precedent,” but I use the label decision here and reserve the label precedent for the 
context of a decision’s stare decisis effect, if any.  
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facts of the case.65 This conclusion is the uncontroversial66 application of 
originalism’s fixation and contribution theses.67 State judges take an oath68
to “support” the Constitution’s original meaning, and are “bound” by it.69
State court judges’ obligation is analogous to the duty of other state and 
federal officers because of the constitutionally prescribed oath they take.70
For example, even if a state supreme court believed that robust gun control 
was more appropriate public policy than individual gun rights, it must still 
follow District of Columbia v. Heller’s71 originalist interpretation of the 
Second Amendment.72
Another way to get to this same conclusion is to think of what 
reasonable reasons73 a state supreme court could give that would justify its 
refusal to follow an originalist U.S. Supreme Court decision. By hypothesis, 
the Supreme Court decision in question correctly articulated and applied the 
Constitution’s authoritative meaning. The state supreme court has before it 
an analogous case and should reach the same conclusion in its case. By 
hypothesis, the state supreme court could not refuse to follow the U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent because the precedent failed to faithfully 
articulate the Constitution’s original meaning, nor could it reject the U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent for its failure to correctly apply that meaning. 
State court judges’ oath therefore compels them to follow originalist U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Crawford 
v. Washington74 decision is originalist—it correctly articulated and applied 
the Constitution’s original meaning—so a state supreme court has no reason 
not to follow it. 
65  Strang, supra note 36, at 1739–51.
66  Uncontroversial within originalism.
67  Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning,
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1 (2015).
68  For an extended argument on the ethical responsibilities of officials who swear oaths, see 
STEVE SHEPPARD, I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR: THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF LEGAL OFFICIALS (2009).
69 See Lee J. Strang, Originalism’s Subject Matter: Why the Declaration of Independence Is Not 
Part of the Constitution, 89 S. CAL. L. REV (forthcoming 2016) (arguing that officer oath-taking binds 
these officers to the written Constitution); Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”: Constitutional 
Indexicals as a Basis for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607 (2009) (arguing 
that the Constitution’s indexicals, when coupled with the Constitution’s chronological identification, 
officer oath-taking, and the Supremacy Clause, supports originalism). But see Richard M. Re, Promising
the Constitution, 110 NW. U.L. REV. 299, 322 (2016) (“Promissory constitutionalism suggests that 
issues of methodology largely turn on the empirical question of how the public understands ‘the 
Constitution.’”).
70  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cls. 2, 3.
71  Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
72 See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).  
73  From an originalist perspective.
74  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  
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By contrast, state court judges are not bound by nonoriginalist 
Supreme Court decisions because those decisions are incorrect 
interpretations or applications of the Constitution. This too is the relatively 
uncontroversial application of originalism’s fixation and contribution 
theses. Nonoriginalist precedent departs from the Constitution’s fixed 
original meaning. The Constitution requires state court judges to take an 
oath to “support” the Constitution75 which binds them to the Constitution’s 
original meaning.76 A Supreme Court decision’s status as a nonoriginalist 
precedent would prevent it from being “in Pursuance” of the Constitution.77
A U.S. Supreme Court decision that is unfaithful to the Constitution’s 
original meaning not only does not bind state court judges; the judges’ oath 
compels them to not follow it.78 If a state court judge followed the 
nonoriginalist decision, that judge would not be “support[ing]” the 
Constitution; he would be undermining it. Nor would the judge be “bound” 
by the Constitution if he followed the nonoriginalist decision. 
Originalism in Good Faith (OIGF) is the standard to determine 
whether a decision is originalist or nonoriginalist. I explained OIGF in prior 
work.79 The OIGF standard requires that a decision evince an objective 
good faith effort to articulate and apply the Constitution’s original 
meaning.80 This evidence is gathered from the decision itself.81 For 
instance, if the opinion evaluated the pertinent historical evidence bearing 
on a question of original meaning, then that is a (not-determinative) reason 
to treat the decision as originalist. A decision is originalist if it meets the 
OIGF standard; a precedent is nonoriginalist if it fails to meet the OIGF 
standard.82
If a decision meets the OIGF standard—if it is an originalist 
precedent—it is protected by a rebuttable presumption.83 This rebuttable 
presumption means that other courts should give the decision respect, 
unless a party overcomes the presumption by showing that there is no 
substantial evidence that the decision is, in fact, originalist.84
A nonoriginalist decision, by contrast, is owed no respect. Such 
decisions either incorrectly articulated or incorrectly applied the 
Constitution’s original meaning. Instead, as I described above, because it is 
75  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
76 Id. art. VI, cl. 3.
77 Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
78 Id. art. VI, cls. 2, 3.
79 See Strang, supra note 35, at 1742–52 (explaining this standard in detail).  
80 Id. at 1743–49.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1751.
84 Id.
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an incorrect constitutional interpretation, state court judges have a duty to 
reject the decision. 
V. STATE COURT JUDGES ARE BOUND BY 
SUPREME COURT JUDGMENTS, NOT OPINIONS
Here, I argue that U.S. Supreme Court judgments are binding on state 
court judges. State court judges’ obligation to follow Supreme Court 
judgments exists regardless of the accuracy of the interpretations supporting 
the judgments. In other words, the judgment of a nonoriginalist precedent 
binds state courts just as much as a judgment in an originalist precedent. 
Judicial decisions today typically have two basic components: a 
judgment and an opinion.85 The judgment is the legal determination of 
liability among the parties to a case.86 It awards or denies the relief claimed 
by the plaintiff(s) from the defendant(s) in the case. In Fairfax’s Devisee v. 
Hunter’s Lessee, for instance, the Supreme Court reviewed a decision of the 
Court of Appeals of Virginia involving the meaning of a treaty.87 The 
Supreme Court reviewed the Virginia court’s decision via a writ of error, 
which was the common law mechanism to review a lower court’s 
judgment.88 The Supreme Court’s decision explained why the Jay Treaty 
required reversal,89 and then issued its mandate to the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia ordering it to enter judgment for Martin.90 The Supreme Court’s 
mandate only required a change of the Court of Appeals of Virginia’s 
judgment; it did not mandate that it agree with the Supreme Court’s legal 
reasoning.
85 See WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2651 (“The decision consists 
of the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law; the rendition of judgment is the pronouncement of 
that decision and the act that gives it legal effect.”); Yoo, supra note 15, at 6. Of course, it is not always 
the case today, and it was more frequently not the case early in the Republic, that Supreme Court 
decisions possessed both opinions and judgments. Today, the Supreme Court disposes of some of its 
cases without an opinion. The early Supreme Court utilized seriatim opinions delivered by the different 
justices.
86  WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 85, § 2651.
87  Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1812).  
88 See 5 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, Appeal and Error § 842 (describing the writ of error).  
89 Fairfax’s Devisee, 11 U.S. at 627.
90 See Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1, 2 (1814) (quoting the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
mandate: “the judgment of the Court of Appeals in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia, in this case 
be, and the same is hereby reversed and annulled, and that the judgment of the District Court of 
Winchester be affirmed, with costs; and it is further ordered, that the said cause be remanded to the said 
Court of Appeals in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia, with instructions to enter judgment for the 
appellant, Philip Martin—and the same is hereby remanded accordingly.—You therefore are hereby 
commanded that such proceedings be had in said cause, as according to right and justice, and the laws of 
the United States, and agreeably to said judgment and instructions of said Supreme Court ought to be 
had, the said writ of error notwithstanding.”).  
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The opinion explains and justifies the judgment in a case.91 The 
opinion ascertains the Constitution’s meaning, evaluates the parties’ 
arguments, and explains which party’s arguments are correct. The opinion 
then describes why the Constitution requires the judgment. For example, in 
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of 
Appeals of Virginia’s judgment.92 Justice Story explained, in the Court’s 
opinion, why Article III’s grant of appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme 
Court authorized the 1789 Judiciary Act Section 25’s grant of jurisdiction to 
the Supreme Court to review state court judgments.93
The core or focal case of the “judicial Power” exercised by the 
Supreme Court (and other federal courts) is its authority to issue final 
judgments.94 These judgments are binding on the parties to the case, and 
officials who have sworn an oath to support the Constitution must follow 
and enforce these judgments.95 This is true even if the judgment rests on an 
incorrect opinion: even if the Supreme Court incorrectly interpreted the 
Constitution.96 Therefore, the other branches of the federal government and 
state officers must enforce Supreme Court judgments, even if they believe 
that a judgment is insufficiently justified.97
Scholars have offered a host of arguments to support this claim, and 
this appears to be the consensus position. These arguments utilize various 
facets of the Constitution’s text and structure, the historical background of 
English and American practice, the Framing and Ratification debates, and 
early practice under the Constitution. For example, Professor William 
Baude relied on Article III’s text and the principle of coordinate branches, 
among many other reasons. He argued that, since Article III “judicial 
Power” operated on (only) cases and controversies, this power culminated 
in the form of judgments. So long as these judgments were within the scope 
of the federal courts’ jurisdiction—so long as they were within an Article 
91 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 85, § 2651 (“The decision consists of the court’s findings 
of fact and conclusions of law; the rendition of judgment is the pronouncement of that decision and the 
act that gives it legal effect.”).
92  Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).  
93 Id.
94  Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211 (1995); Baude, supra note 23.
95  Yoo, supra note 15, at 6.
96  Baude, supra note 23, at 1809; Yoo, supra note 15, at 7.
97  Professor Paulsen has powerfully argued that the President possesses “the Merryman power” 
to refuse to follow both Supreme Court opinions and judgments. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 81 (1993); Paulsen, supra note 23. In this Essay, I do not finally commit to a position on Professor 
Paulsen’s claims. Most of Professor Paulsen’s claims apply to the federal and not state governments. If 
Professor Paulsen is correct, and if his claims are applicable to state courts, then both U.S. Supreme 
Court opinions and judgments are not binding, and my narrower claim that state courts are not bound by 
U.S. Supreme Court judgments remains correct.
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III case or controversy—they were authoritative, in a manner similar to the 
authority of a congressional statute passed within the scope of its 
jurisdiction, its Article I powers.98
My own (very tentative) view is that Supreme Court judgments are 
binding on state courts because of a combination of Articles I, III, and VI. 
The Supremacy Clause requires that state court judges privilege only those 
“Laws” made “in Pursuance” of the Constitution.99 There are two steps that 
must occur in order for a U.S. Supreme Court action to actualize a state 
court judge’s Supremacy Clause obligation to follow it; for the judge to be 
“bound” by a Supreme Court judgment. First, the federal legal norm must 
be a “Law.” Second, it must be “in Pursuance” of the Constitution. 
Congress, exercising its Necessary and Proper Clause authority “[t]o 
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this Constitution . . . in any 
Department or Officer”100 and to execute Article III, passed the Judiciary 
Act of 1789.101 Section 25 of the Act authorized the Supreme Court to 
review state court “judgments” via the common law writ of error.102 This is 
a “Law” within the Supremacy Clause’s meaning,103 and it is undisputed 
that Section 25 was constitutional.104
When the Supreme Court reversed a state court’s judgment before the 
Court via its appellate jurisdiction, within the scope of and to effectuate its 
Article III “judicial Power,” and pursuant to Section 25, that exercise of 
power is privileged by the Supremacy Clause. The Supremacy Clause 
ordered a state court that received a U.S. Supreme Court mandate to reverse 
its judgment and follow the Supreme Court’s mandate over its own prior 
state court judgment. This same analysis holds true for the current 
constitutional and statutory authorization of Supreme Court review of state 
court judgments.105
By contrast, Supreme Court opinions are not binding on other federal 
branches or state officials.106 Article III and statutory authorization to 
98 Baude, supra note 23, at 1832–33.
99 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
100 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
101 An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).  
102 Id. § 25.
103 See Pfander, supra note 53, at 228 (rejecting the claim that the Supreme Court’s precedents, 
by themselves, are encompassed by the Supremacy Clause).  
104 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 85, § 4006 (“These successive statutory provisions rest 
on an unassailable constitutional foundation.”).  
105 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a); see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 85, § 4006 (explaining the 
evolution of the Supreme Court’s authority to review state court judgments and current law).  
106 See Baude, supra note 23, at 1810 (“[The Supreme Court] has no power to tell other people 
not before the court what they should do.”) (emphasis omitted). Within the federal judicial branch, 
federal judges must give both judgments and opinions significant respect because of their status as 
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review state court decisions extends only to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
judgments, not its opinions. The articulation of the Court’s reasons for its 
judgment are not necessary to effectuate the exercise of its Article III power 
and beyond its statutory authority, both of which privilege only judgments. 
There is therefore no “Law” “in Pursuance” of the Constitution upon which 
the Supremacy Clause may operate. 
The Supreme Court’s opinions’ force rests entirely on their ability to 
persuade that they embody correct interpretations of the Constitution. In 
fact, until John Marshall became Chief Justice, there were no opinions of 
the Court, only the seriatim opinions of the various justices. It was therefore 
impossible for the Court’s interpretative reasoning to bind other 
government officers because it did not exist, unless a majority of the 
justices in their seriatim opinions agreed on the same interpretative 
reasoning, which was unlikely. 
In sum, state court judges must follow U.S. Supreme Court judgments 
in all cases within the Court’s case or controversy and appellate 
jurisdiction, and authorized by (constitutional) federal statute. This duty 
applies even when the interpretative reasons supporting the judgments are 
nonoriginalist. 
VI. CANONICAL ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING JUDICIAL REVIEW
SHOW THAT STATE COURT JUDGES ARE NOT BOUND BY 
NONORIGINALIST SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
In this Part, I bring together the claims made in Parts IV and V and 
couple them with canonical arguments used to justify judicial review. I 
argue that state court judges are not bound by nonoriginalist Supreme Court 
opinions because of the confluence of two related characteristics. First, if a 
Supreme Court decision is an incorrect nonoriginalist interpretation of the 
Constitution, its warrant as an interpretation of the Constitution fails. 
Second, since the authoritativeness of a Supreme Court’s opinion is 
dependent on its accuracy, then a nonoriginalist opinion lacks authority. 
The arguments utilized by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 78,107
and Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison,108 support state judge 
interpretative independence when faced with nonoriginalist Supreme Court 
opinions. First, both Hamilton and Marshall relied on the separation of 
powers to argue that the status of the Supreme Court as coordinate with the 
other federal branches supported the exercise of judicial review. Each 
“inferior” members of the branch. The Supreme Court’s opinions facilitate its supervision of the lower 
federal courts.
107  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
108  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  
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branch of the federal government, they argued, would exercise its powers 
independently—separately—from the others. When Congress legislated, for 
example, it would necessarily interpret the Constitution to determine 
whether it had the authority to pass an act and whether the act complied 
with constitutional limitations. Similarly, the Supreme Court would 
necessarily determine the Constitution’s meaning in (some of) its cases. 
Each branch, they argued, was coordinate so that no single branch’s 
constitutional interpretations were controlling on the others. If it was 
otherwise, then that would mean that one branch’s interpretations were 
preeminent, which conflicted with the bedrock structural principle of branch 
coordinancy.
This same argument justifies state judge interpretative independence 
from nonoriginalist Supreme Court opinions. Unlike in Marbury, the 
bedrock constitutional principle at work in this context is federalism. 
Federalism is the principle that the federal and state governments are 
supreme in their respective spheres of authority and that each may not 
regulate in the other’s sphere. 
The Supreme Court and the respective state supreme courts are 
coordinate courts, within their respective spheres. The Supreme Court’s 
opinions are binding on state courts when it acts within its sphere of 
Supremacy Clause authority, which is when its opinions meet the 
Originalism in Good Faith standard. Similarly, when the Supreme Court’s 
opinions are nonoriginalist, they are not supreme over state judges, and 
state judges exercise coordinate interpretative authority. 
Chief Justice Marshall also argued that, because federal judges swore 
an oath to support the Constitution,109 they must utilize their own 
interpretative judgment when exercising the judicial power.110 This meant 
that federal judges must make their own good faith judgments on the 
Constitution’s meaning and cannot blindly follow to Congress’ or the 
President’s interpretations of the Constitution. 
This same argument supports state judge interpretative independence 
from Supreme Court nonoriginalist interpretations. Article VI expressly 
enjoins state court judges to “support” the Constitution. In the exercise of 
their state judicial power, state judges must make good faith judgments on 
the Constitution’s meaning. They cannot unthinkingly follow the Supreme 
Court’s interpretations of the Constitution. The Constitution’s text makes 
this corollary patent because it treats federal and state judges identically: 
“judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States”111
must take the oath. 
109  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
110 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 180.
111  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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VII. STATE COURT JUDGE INTERPRETATIVE INDEPENDENCE
FROM NONORIGINALIST SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
ADVANCES THE VALUES OF FEDERALISM
The Supreme Court and scholars have identified three primary benefits 
from the federal structure of the United States. First, the most frequently 
identified value of federalism is that it protects individual liberty, and 
through two primary mechanisms. The first mechanism is dividing power 
among different governments. Vertically dividing power among 
governments prevents the concentration of power, which is a necessary 
precondition to the suppression of liberty. Relatedly, dividing power among 
different governments also provides mechanisms to check governmental 
power.112 One government can check another government by active or 
passive resistance to its exercises of power and, in doing so, protect 
individual liberty.113
The second mechanism is creating jurisdictional competition for the 
affections of people. Humans value liberty so, when governments compete 
for citizens and their affections, one of the axes upon which they compete is 
liberty. The states and federal governments compete to offer regulatory 
“packages” that contain the most liberty. 
Second, the Supreme Court and scholars argue that federalism creates 
space for jurisdictional experimentation. In a unitary state, there is only one 
jurisdiction and only that government can experiment with different 
approaches to subject matters. Experimentation presents significant risk 
because the entire jurisdiction suffers if the experiment fails. And that 
assumes that experimentation will occur, which is more difficult in unitary 
states because of the difficulty garnering a sufficient consensus to 
experiment. 
Federalism both increases the likelihood of experimentation and 
reduces the risks posed by it. It is more likely that experimentation will 
occur in a federal system because one state is more likely than the entire 
nation to have a consensus to experiment because of the uneven distribution 
of preferences. Furthermore, if an experiment fails to provide net benefits, 
the experiment’s costs are limited to that one state, and the other 
jurisdictions in fact benefit from that state’s failed experiment by not 
duplicating it. 
112  For example, the federal government does not possess an enumerated power over education 
so that, at least until very recently, states were the primary directors of American education policy, 
which helped states form young Americans in distinct and healthy ways.  
113  For instance, many northern states passively and actively resisted repatriation of purported 
slaves to the South pursuant to the original and 1850 Fugitive Slave Acts.  
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Currently, some states are experimenting with alternative approaches 
to drugs. Some states are relaxing restrictions on drug use. These states had 
a sufficient consensus to engage in this experiment. Since the jury is still 
out on whether these experiments are beneficial, any costs from this 
experiment are internalized by the experimenting states, and the other states 
in the Union will benefit from both the experimenting states’ successes and 
failures.
Third, federalism provides a greater variety of environments in which 
the reasonable diversity of forms of human flourishing can find a home. 
Human beings flourish through a nearly infinite variety of combinations of 
the basic human goods.114 Some humans, for example, value the good of 
knowledge relatively more than others, while other people value friendship 
more than other goods, etc. This same reasonable diversity of approaches to 
human flourishing occurs on the state level. 
States in a federal system have the capacity to construct reasonably 
different “packages” of background services that cater to different avenues 
of human flourishing. For instance, a state may reasonably choose to 
regulate its citizens’ lives, or one facet of life, more or less than another 
state. Iowa regulates farm activity less than California because these states 
reasonably balance the costs and benefits of farming and its impact on other 
facets of life differently. Iowa, for example, prioritizes family farming over 
other business structures for agriculture production. 
State court interpretative autonomy from nonoriginalist Supreme Court 
opinions advances federalism’s values. Of course, it is difficult to measure 
a priori how this autonomy will advance federalism. My arguments 
supporting this claim are tentative and do not offer a full analysis of the 
issue. Nevertheless, for each of these three federalism values—liberty, 
experimentation, and diverse human flourishing—current practice identifies 
examples of state court interpretative autonomy advancing them. 
First, state interpretative autonomy currently exists where states can 
interpret their state constitutions to provide “greater”115 protection to 
individual rights than the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretations of the 
federal Constitution.116 This has occurred, for instance, in some states 
following the Supreme Court’s rulings that the Free Speech Clause did not 
protect free speech activities in privately owned shopping centers.117
California’s Supreme Court interpreted the California Constitution’s free 
114 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 90 (1980).
115 I put “greater” in quotes because it is not always clear whether the different protection 
afforded through state constitutional interpretation results in a net increase in liberty.
116 William J. Brennan, Jr., States Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
117 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).  
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speech clause to provide protection of speech on privately owned shopping 
malls.118 The California Supreme Court’s interpretative independence 
rejected the federal interpretation so that, within California, greater freedom 
of speech prevailed. 
Second, existing state interpretative autonomy has led to 
experimentation. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Takings 
Clause to permit government taking of private property and transferring it 
to another private party to obtain the public benefit generated by increased 
economic activity from the new use(s) for the property.119 Both before and 
after Kelo, state courts interpreted their state constitutions to provide a 
different and greater level of protection for property owners. For instance, 
in City of Norwood v. Horney, the Ohio Supreme Court expressly rejected 
the federal path and ruled that the Ohio Constitution’s takings clause 
prohibited such takings.120 The interpretative independence exercised by 
states like Ohio is providing a series of experiments regarding which 
interpretation(s) provide the most net benefit. 
Third, existing state interpretative autonomy has provided space for 
the reasonable diversity of human life to find a home. One area where 
humans have reasonably diverged is the extent to which the law should 
protect religious beliefs and religiously motivated actions from legal 
regulation when that regulation is not targeted at religion. Religion is a 
basic human good the exploration of which adds to human flourishing. 
However, the fact that religion is valuable does not, by itself, determine the 
extent to which religiously inspired activity should be shielded from 
government regulation. The U.S. Supreme Court famously ruled that the 
Free Exercise Clause did not protect religiously motivated activity from 
neutral government regulation, that is regulation not targeted at the 
religiously motivated activity.121 That is a reasonable,122 though not (at least 
at the time) a popular approach.123 State supreme courts prior to and after 
Smith utilized their interpretative independence to provide more robust 
protection to religiously motivated activity. For instance, the Ohio Supreme 
118  Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979).
119  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  
120  City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E. 2d 353 (Ohio 2006).
121  Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Nat’l Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (199).  
122 See Gerard v. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of 
Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245 (1991) (supporting Smith).
123  Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the 
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992) (reviewing arguments concerning constitutional religious 
exemptions); Michael W. McConnell, Exchange; Religious Participation in Public Programs: Religious 
Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1992) (arguing that the religion clauses should be 
read together to promote religious freedom); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the 
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) (criticizing Smith as both historically and 
philosophically wrong).
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Court rejected Smith and ruled that the Ohio Constitution’s free exercise 
clause provided greater protection to religiously motivated activity.124
In sum, state court interpretative autonomy from nonoriginalist 
Supreme Court opinions provides space for federalism to operate and state 
supreme courts may utilize this autonomy in a way that advances 
federalism’s values. 
VIII. MY ARGUMENT FOR STATE COURT JUDGE
INTERPRETATIVE INDEPENDENCE FROM NONORIGINALIST
SUPREME COURT OPINIONS IS MODEST
The first reaction that many scholars have to the proposal that state 
courts should have modest interpretative independence is negative. They 
associate state court interpretative independence with segregationist 
resistance to Brown,125 which culminated in Cooper v. Aaron.126 More 
recently, scholars have expressed distress at the fleeting and modest 
rumblings in some quarters that Obergefell v. Hodges127 incorrectly 
interpreted the Constitution. There are real and powerful reasons to avoid 
significant state court interpretative independence. However, this Essay’s 
prescription for interpretative independence is modest. 
This modest state court interpretative independence from 
nonoriginalist Supreme Court opinions fits most of American historical 
legal practice. Throughout American history, federal and state officers have 
frequently contested U.S. Supreme Court interpretations, but they have 
nearly always followed the Court’s judgments. For instance, even though 
President Lincoln disagreed with the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
interpretation in Dred Scott v. Sanford,128 he argued that the Court’s 
judgment was binding. 
My prescription is modest because, as a practical matter, the U.S. 
Supreme Court possesses the authority to eventually force state courts to 
follow its nonoriginalist interpretations, if it has the political will to do so.
This would occur when a state supreme court’s judgments contrary to the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s nonoriginalist interpretations are repeatedly reviewed 
by the U.S. Supreme Court and repeatedly reversed. This process is 
certainly more time-consuming than state courts simply falling into line 
upon the Supreme Court’s initial utterance of a constitutional interpretation. 
But, the practical result is ultimately the same: The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
124  Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E. 2d 1039 (Ohio 2000).  
125  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
126  Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
127  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
128  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
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nonoriginalist interpretation is and remains the governing law within the 
state, despite the state supreme court’s disagreement. 
This end result of my argument for modest state court interpretative 
autonomy in the face of U.S. Supreme Court nonoriginalist interpretations 
might cause one to ask: so what’s the point? The difference is that, with the 
arguments I presented, the U.S. Supreme Court may still be able to force 
state supreme courts to follow its nonoriginalist interpretations, but it has to 
utilize significant political capital over an extended period of time to do so. 
Let me point to an historical example that exemplifies this: the saga of 
Ableman v. Booth.129 Ableman is one case in a long series of episodes of 
northern state resistance to the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act. The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court repeatedly rejected the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional 
interpretation that justified the Act. The U.S. Supreme Court, under Chief 
Justice Taney, repeatedly reversed the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Even 
after the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings, Wisconsin continued to resist the 
Act. In Ableman, the U.S. Supreme Court was able to enforce its 
constitutional interpretation, but only at the cost of resources and political 
capital expended repeatedly checking and reversing the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court. This resistance by the Wisconsin Supreme Court provided a very 
public statement of a different constitutional interpretation,  a period of 
practical resistance to the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation, and a focal 
point for opposition to the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation. 
My modest prescription preserves the U.S. Supreme Court’s and 
federal interpretative supremacy while, at the same time, preserving a space 
for states to articulate a different constitutional interpretation that may—or 
may not—over time, provide an opportunity for other government officers 
to cooperate, reject, or push back against U.S. Supreme Court nonoriginalist 
interpretations.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this brief Essay, I provided a tentative argument for modest state 
court interpretative independence. I argued that state courts possess 
interpretative independence from nonoriginalist U.S. Supreme Court 
interpretations. I also argued that state courts must follow all Supreme 
Court judgments and originalist Supreme Court opinions. I closed by 
suggesting that this modest state court interpretative independence is likely 
to advance federalism’s three primary values. 
129  Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).  
